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Coal and Coalbed Methane Development in the FlatheadAn International Water Dispute*
Allan Ingelson,** Lincoln Mitchell*** and Sean Assie****
ABSTRACT
Coalbed methane (CBM), development in British Columbia, is in its
infancy. The proposed coal mine and CBM testing along the Flathead
River in southern British Columbia can provide economic benefits to the
province, but the projects have the potential for negative environmental
impacts on water resources in Canada and downstream in Montana,
near Glacier National Park. Objections to the proposed mineral
extraction projects have been raised by local residents and
environmental groups in Canada and the United States, as well as by
Montana State politicians and federal government officials. In light of
the reported environmental problems from CBM produced water in the
Western United States, the different physical and chemical
characteristicsof coals in each sedimentary basin, and the lack of CBM
operational experience in British Columbia, there is significant
uncertainty about the potential downstream water impacts and
cumulative effects from proposed coal and CBM projects. The Canadian
Government has a legal obligation to prevent water degradation in the
FlatheadRiver, which flows into the United States. U.S. regulators have
more experience and expertise than Canadian regulators with CBM
operations and environmental assessmentsfor CBM projects. Consistent
with the precautionary principle and Canada's legal obligation to
protect the quality of the water that flows from British Columbia into
Montana, a Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (TEIA)
should be undertaken to examine the cumulative effects of the proposed
projects and to consider the relevant studies completed by U.S. scientists.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In regard to the first commercial CBM field in British Columbia announced
in January 2009, Hon. Richard Neufeld, the Minister responsible for mining and
energy development in the province stated:
Unconventional gas development plays an important role in British
Columbia's future energy security. Investment in coalbed gas
development and the realization of gas royalties and taxes from coalbed
gas production and sales will help fuel the Province's economy. The
Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources acknowledges your
accomplishment in coalbed gas development and looks forward to
continuing to work with industry to allow the sector to succeed while
balancing economic and social priorities and protecting our environment
and quality of life.'
Coal mining and CBM development are proposed on provincial Crown lands
along the Flathead River in the province. The river flows into Montana near
Glacier National Park. An open pit coal mine could remove two million tons of
coal per year for two decades. In addition, oil and gas companies have been
exploring the economic potential for CBM production. The Flathead basin, which
extends across the Canadian-U.S. border, is one of North America's more
pristine ecosystems with diverse fish species.
The proposed mineral development along the Flathead has prompted
controversy and opposition from residents on both sides of the border since the
1970s. In 1982, the Cabin Creek Mine was conditionally approved by the British
Columbia Environmental and Land Use Committee (ELUC).2 Conditions for
mine development were developed in "response to Montana's concerns and
included requirements that Sage Creek complete in-depth studies of the fisheries
and wildlife of the area."3 In response to objections from the State of Montana in
1984 pursuant to the International Boundary Waters Treaty4, the British
Columbian government agreed to a referral to the International Joint Commission
(IJC). In 1988, the IJC concluded there was significant uncertainty about the
environmental effects from the proposed coal mine and recommended that the
mine should not be approved until the "[P]otential transboundary impacts...
1. Press Release, Canada Energy Partners Inc., Gas Sales from the First Commercial Coalbed Methane
Project in British Columbia (Jan 5, 2009), available at http://www.canadaenergypartners.com/news/index.
hp?&content-id=79.
2.

See Dino Ross, InternationalManagement of the FlatheadRiver Basin, I COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &

POL'Y 223, 226-27 (1990) (discussing Sage Creek's proposal and approval for the building of two open-pit
mines).
3. Id. at 227 (quoting Wilson, Cabin Creek and InternationalLaw-An Overview, 5 PUB. LAND L. REV.,
110, 117 (1984)).
4. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United
States and Canada, U.S.-GR. BRIT., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
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have been determined with reasonable certainty and would constitute a level of
risk acceptable to both Governments; and, the potential impacts on the sport fish
populations and habitat. .. would not occur or could be fully mitigated in an
effective and assured manner."'
In response to the more recent Lodgepole Coal Mine Proposal, Willie R.
Taylor, of the U. S. Department of the Interior's Office of Environmental Policy
and Compliance, in a letter dated February 21, 2007, to the Office of Canadian
Affairs stated the proposed projects "[M]ay threaten the natural resource values
of two landholdings of the Interior, Glacier National Park and the Flathead
National Wild and Scenic River. A World Biosphere Reserve and a World
Heritage Site, along with the Crown of the Continent and the International Peace
Park at Waterton-Glacier. . . ." are also in the region.6
During the last five years, in addition to proposed coal mining, CBM
exploration has been undertaken in the province. British Petroleum (BP) has
expressed interest in developing CBM in the Flathead Basin as part of its Mist
Mountain Coalbed Gas Project. The initial application for tenure referral
provides the energy developer with the right to apply to the British Columbian
Oil and Gas Commission for permission to access, explore, and develop the
resource, including an area in the Flathead Basin south of Fernie. Although the
British Columbian government has now excluded the Flathead portion from
tenure referral, it has noted that BP might be able to apply for CBM tenure in the
future. BP volunteered to include the Flathead Basin in the environmental study
that the company is conducting in south eastern British Columbia. The oil and
gas company has indicated that it may apply for coalbed gas tenure in the
Flathead Basin in the future.
In light of negative water impacts downstream in Montana from the surface
discharge of water produced from Wyoming CBM wells-Montana residents and
some British Colombia residents, environmental groups, the state Governor,
senators, Glacier Park officials, and the U.S. federal government have objected to
the proposed coal and CBM development along the Flathead. A key concern is
that effluent or "produced water" from the coal mine and CBM operations will
flow into the Flathead River and negatively impact the water quality and sport
fishing resources downstream in the United States. As there is significant
uncertainty about the cumulative effects from both types of fossil fuel extraction
in British Columbia, a comprehensive environmental impact assessment on the
proposed mineral development has been requested by the State of Montana.
The next section will discuss the legal obligation of the Canadian
Government to prevent the degradation of the quality of water in the Flathead

5.

INT'L JOINT COMM'N, IMPACTS OF A PROPOSED COAL MINE IN THE FLATHEAD RIVER BASIN 11

(1988), availableat http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/pdf/ID590.pdf [hereinafter ICJ REPORT].

6. Letter from Willie R. Taylor, Dir., Office of Envtl. Policy and Compliance: U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
to Edward Alexander Lee, Office Dir., Office of Canadian Affairs: U.S. Dep't of State, (Feb. 21, 2007),
availableat http://www.flathead basincommission.org/mining/cline/reference/DOl2_21 07.pdf.
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River that flows into the United States. The paper then analyzes the different
federal and provincial environment impact assessment (EIA) regimes in Canada,
and considers challenges to sustainable development posed by coal mining and
CBM development in the Flathead River Basin. The paper will also evaluate the
water protection regime for CBM development adopted in British Columbia and
compare the provincial scheme with the regulatory framework for produced
water in Montana. Finally, this paper considers opportunities for increased
coherency or integration between the Canadian and U. S. EIA systems in regard
to coal and CBM projects.
II. THE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES REGARDING WATER IN THE FLATHEAD RIVER

In light of decisions in The Trail Smelter Arbitration7 and the Lac Lanoux
Arbitration' this paper suggests that under customary international law, the
Canadian Government has a duty to avoid environmental harm such as the
degradation of water quality in the Flathead River that flows into the United
States. As quoted from Responsibility of States in InternationalLaw and cited in
the Trail Smelter case, "[a] State owes at all times a duty to protect other States
against injurious acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction." 9
The Trail Smelter decision, which reflects a "polluter liability" principle in
the context of air emissions,' ° was followed by the Lac Lanoux decision in which
a similar approach was used in a water degradation dispute between Spain and
France.
It should also be noted that there is ongoing transboundary litigation in which
the operator of the Trail Smelter is being pursued by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and other U.S. residents for water contamination to the
Columbia River, which flows from British Columbia into the United States." For
much of the 20th century, the Trail Smelter allegedly dumped millions of tonnes
of industrial toxic waste into the river. One report concluded that that Trail
Smelter dumped the equivalent of "one full dumptruck [of slag] every hour for
sixty years."' 2 Slag is a "fine, black, sand-like substance that's a by-product of the
smelting process,"' 3 and has accumulated in heavy deposits along the banks of

7.
8.

Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965 (1941).
Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. Fr.) 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1957).

9.

LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & WORLD ORDER 1409

(2d ed., 1999).
10. See Sanford E. Gaines, The Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to Environmental
Ethos, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 463, 468 (1991).
11. See Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. v. Lloyd's Underwriters, [2009] S.C.R.1 I (Can.); Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1095 (2008).
12. Chris Brown, A Century of Slag, CBC NEWS, Dec. 15, 2003, available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/
background/environment/centuryofslag.html.
13. Id.
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the Columbia River. The EPA has detected "exceptionally high quantities of
arsenic, lead, mercury and other contaminants in the river..."" In response to the
industrial waste, U.S. citizens, "including Native American Tribes," have
claimed that they have been subject to environmental degradation and health
problems. 5 A refusal on the part of the Canadian government to submit to the IJC
has led the EPA to take unprecedented measures to ensure the cleanup of the
Columbia River and Roosevelt Lake. 6 The EPA is "attempting to apply" U.S.
domestic environmental cleanup laws to Teck Cominco Metals Ltd., the operator
of the Trail Smelter, a Canadian company.'7 As well, two Native American Tribe
members filed lawsuits against the company under the citizen's suit provisions of
the U.S. Superfund laws."
In addition to emerging international environmental law, the duty to protect
the quality of the water in the Flathead River is consistent with the general
objective of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,' 9
which is to protect the environment for present and future generations based on
cooperation as provided under Article One.
A. JurisdictionalUncertainty in the Regulation of TransboundaryFreshwaterin
Canada-A Challengefor Sustainable Development
Freshwater governance is complicated because when the British North
America Ado was adopted in 1867, the division of legislative powers in the
Canadian Constitution did not specifically assign responsibility for freshwater to
either the federal government or the provincial governments. The Constitution
provides for "heads of power" between the federal and provincial governments.
This allocation of jurisdiction is exclusive in that if the Constitution provides one
level of government with jurisdiction over a matter, it excludes the other level
from legislating on that subject matter. If one level of government passes a
statute or regulation governing a matter over which the Constitution gives the
other an exclusive power to legislate, a court may strike down the law as being
ultra vires. Because the powers enumerated in the Constitution Act are not
exhaustive, Canadian courts have the responsibility to determine jurisdiction in
accordance with interpretive rules that have evolved in law.

14. Austen Parrish, Trail Smelter Ddij vu, Extraterritoriality,InternationalEnvtl. Law, and the Search
for Solutions to Canadian-U.S.Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363, 366 (2005).

15.
16.

Id.
Id. at 366-67, 379.

17.

Id.

18. See id. at 366-67.
19. See generally North American Agreement on Envtl. Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., opened for
signatureSept. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
20. Constitution Act, 1867 (also known as British North American Act 1867), 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3 (U.K.),
as reprinted in R.S.C. app. § 2 no. 5.
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It is clear that non-renewable natural resources such as coal and CBM are
21
under the sole jurisdiction of the provinces, unless the minerals are located on
federal lands or the proposed mineral development impacts federal jurisdiction.
Some of the specific provincial "heads of power" relevant to the freshwater in the
Flathead River include: "[t]he management and sale of the public lands
belonging to the province",22 "[including] timber and wood thereon"; 23 "Local
works and undertakings ... ,;24 "Property and civil rights ... ,;2 "[A]ll matters of
a merely local or private nature"; 26 and "[P]enalties ... for[ violating]
provinc[ial] law. 27
The relevant "heads of power" that the federal government has available to
legislate for the protection of water and fisheries resources include: "[P]ublic
debt and public property";28 "[T]rade and commerce"; 29 "Raising money by...
taxation";30 "Navigation and shipping"; 31 "Seacoast and inland fisheries";32
"[Matters that regard] Indians and lands reserved for Indians";3 3 "The criminal
law...

";4

"[Extra provincial] works and undertakings...

,,;3',,[

Works] for the

general advantage of Canada... ,;16 "[To establish] peace, order, and good
government... ,;37 and to implement any international treaty which Great Britain
entered on behalf of Canada."s
The federal government has the right to legislate freshwater on federal lands
in national parks and in other federal reserved lands, as well as all resources on
these lands (e.g., timber, water, range, wildlife and mines and minerals). In
regard to fish in the Flathead River, the Canadian federal government has
jurisdiction to regulate commercial, sport or recreation fishery habitat in fresh

21. Id. at § 92A(; see also Natural Resource Transfer Agreement (NRTA). The NRTA is found in the
Constitution Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 4, c. 26 (U.K), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. § 2, no. 26.
22. Public lands in Canada are primarily owned by the provinces and not the federal government,
although the federal government does own the lands in national parks, and Indian lands.
23. Constitution Act 1867, § 92(5).
24. Id. § 92(10).
25. Id. § 92(13).
26. Id. § 92(16).
27. Id. § 92(15).
28. Id. § 91(l)(A).
29. Constitution Act, 1867 (also known as British North American Act 1867), 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3,
§ 91(2) (U.K.), as reprintedin R.S.C. app. § 2 no. 5.
30. Id. § 91(3).
31. Id. § 91(10).
32. Id. § 91(12).
33. Id. § 91(24).
34. Id. § 91(27).
35. Constitution Act, 1867 (also known as British North American Act 1867), 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3,
§ 92(10)(a) (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C. app. § 2 no. 5.
36. Id. § 92(10)(c).
37. Id. §91.
38. Id. § 132.
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water whether on federal or non-federal lands and whether on private or public
lands.
The British Columbia government has the right to legislate over freshwater,
including water courses and water bodies on provincial lands, in provincial parks,
and all resources on these lands. In addition, the provincial government can
legislate and set water pollution and soil contamination standards for provincial
Crown lands within the province. The federal government has the right to
legislate deletion inter-provincial pollution, as well as the right to regulate toxic
substances wherever they occur.39
Numerous federal and provincial government acts, as well as nongovernmental initiatives, influence freshwater management in Canada. When it is
unclear whether a federal or provincial government has jurisdiction over a matter,
the Canadian courts have three options. The courts may decide that the matter
falls within the power of either the federal or provincial government. In
interpreting the jurisdiction over the subject matter, the courts will characterize
the essence or pith and substance of the legislation to determine the constitutional
validity of an act. If the essence of a law provides for provincial authority over
subject matter that falls under federal jurisdiction, or vice versa, then the court
will declare the law to be ultra vires.4°
Alternatively, the court may decide that neither level of government has
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter. In such a case, the court can apply
the double aspect doctrine, which means that both levels of government can
legislate certain aspects of that matter. For instance, the British Columbia
government may pass legislation regulating pollution in the Flathead River since
the provinces have the jurisdiction to legislate for the protection of property and
civil rights. The federal government may also pass legislation regulating water
pollution that interferes with fish habitat in the Flathead River, because it has
jurisdiction to regulate inland and coastal fisheries. If the double aspect doctrine
applies, then both the provincial and federal laws operate concurrently. Should
conflict occur between the operation of the laws, Canadian courts, applying the
doctrine of federal paramountcy, will recognize the standing of the federal law
and declare the provincial law to be inoperative to the extent that it conflicts with
the federal. Thirdly, the courts may conclude that the Constitution confers neither
exclusive jurisdiction nor shared jurisdiction over a matter. As the federal
government is provided with the power to regulate residual matters,4' such a
matter usually falls under federal jurisdiction. Arguably transboundary
freshwater in the Flathead River is a matter that falls under the residual power of

See R v. Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (Can.).
See Alastair R. Lucas, Natural Resources and Envriomental Management: A JurisdictionalPrimer,
in ENVIROMENTAL PROTECTION AND CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 31, 31-35 (Donna Tingley ed., 1987).
41. Constitution Act, 1867 (also known as British North American Act 1867), 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3, § 91
(U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C. app. § 2 no. 5 (stating that the peace, order, and good government clause, imply
the federal right to legislate over residual matters found neither in federal nor provincial jurisdiction).
39.
40.
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the federal government. However, provincial governments like the British
Columbian government often take the lead in reaching regional agreements with
cross-border partners in the United States, such42 as the British Columbia and
Montana Environmental CooperationAgreement.
As noted, under Section 91(12) of the Constitution Act, the federal
government has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate all matters concerning coastal
and inland fisheries, which is the basis for the federal FisheriesAct. 43 Although
the federal parliament possesses this exclusive jurisdiction, the provinces may
exercise some legislative control over matters that concern fish. Section 92(5) of
the Canadian Constitution provides the British Columbia government with the
exclusive right to legislate the management and sale of public lands. Because
provinces own the fish within their boundaries, they can pass laws relating to
proprietary aspects of fish, such as fishing regulations, as found in the British
Columbia- FisheriesAct." As with the founding provincial governments, Section
109 provides the British Columbian government with exclusive jurisdiction over
the development of minerals on provincial lands adjacent to the Flathead River.
In Fowler v. The Queen

and Northwest Falling Contractors v. The Queen,46

Canada's highest court ruled that the federal government had the jurisdiction to
protect fish and habitat, even if the project in question is on provincial Crown
lands 7 In other decisions, the power granted to the federal government under the
"Peace, Order and Good Government" 48 (POGG) clause was the basis for
allowing federal regulation in matters that seemingly fell under provincial
jurisdiction. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R v. Crown
Zellerbach Can. Ltd., decided that the POGG power was an acceptable legal
basis for federal environmental regulation of provincial territorial waters in
British Columbia. 4'The federal government also has exclusive jurisdiction over
criminal law as provided in Section 91(27) of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Hydro-Quebec, ° ruled that the federal government can
legislate to protect public health under the criminal law power. Pursuant to

42. Envtl. Cooperation Arrangement Between the Province of British Columbia and the State of
Montana, B.C.-Mont. (2003), available at http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/spd/docs/Montana_ENVIRONMENTAL_
COOPARRANGEMENT.pdf.
43. Fisheries Act, R.S.C., ch. F-14 (1985) (Can.).
44. Fisheries Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 149 (1996) (Can.); see generally STEVEN A. KENNETI, MANAGING
INTERJURISDICTIONAL WATERS IN CANADA: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (1991).

45. [198012 S.C.R. 213 (Can.).
46. [1980] 2 S.C.R. 292 (Can.).
47. See DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIROMENTAL. LAW AND
POLICY (Sarah Wight ed., 2003).
48. Constitution Act, 1867 (also known as British North American Act 1867), 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3, § 91
(U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C. app. § 2 no. 5.
49. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.).
50. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (Can.).

2010 / Coal and Coalbed Methane Development in the Flathead
Section 91(27), the federal government can protect the environment "through
prohibitions against toxic substances ... a wholly legitimate ...objective. .

.

B. Federaland ProvincialJurisdictionand the EnvironmentalImpact
Assessment Process
This is an important issue because there are differences in the EIA processes
administered by the federal and British Columbian governments. These
differences will affect the thoroughness of the environmental assessment for the
proposed coal and CBM projects, and the mitigation requirements to minimize
water impacts. The federal regulatory approval process under the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act" (CEAA) is generally viewed to be more
thorough than the British Columbian environmental assessment process. While
no Canadian judicial decisions have directly addressed the issue of transboundary
freshwater, there have been some decisions in regard to jurisdiction over the
environment, pollution, and aboriginal lands impacted by development.
53 the
In Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Minister of Transportation,
Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the federal government had the authority to
require a federal environmental impact assessment on a dam project under the "Peace
Order and Good Government" clause in the Canadian Constitution. This precedent
supports a broad power for the federal government to enact environmental protection
legislation. If the federal government decides to conduct a federal environmental
impact assessment on the proposed Lodgepole Coal Mine or CBM projects, it likely
can be based on the constitutional powers provided to the national government.
While environmental protection has been assigned a double aspect by Canadian
courts, in the case where there could be environmental impacts across the
international border, the POGG power appears to be a reasonable basis for federal
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Quebec (Attorney General)v. Canadaand the
Cree Regional Authority,5 4 held that the National Energy Board, a federal
government regulator, had jurisdiction to conduct a federal environmental impact
assessment based on the federal trade and commerce power for a hydro-electric dam
and the export of electricity to the United States. As well, under Section 91(24) of the
Canadian Constitution, the federal government has jurisdiction over "Indians, and
lands reserved for Indians." This power provides the federal government with
indirect jurisdiction over projects that may have environmental impacts on residents
of Indian reserves." Since the Constitutional Amendments in 1982,56 aboriginal and

51. Neil Hawke, Canadian Federalismand Enviromental Protection, 14 J. ENVTL. L.185, 188 (2002).
52. Canadian Enviromental Assessment Act, 1992 S.C., ch. 37 (Can.).
53. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
54. [1994] 1 S.C.R. 159 (Can.).
55.

(1996).

KATHRYN HARRISON, PASSING THE BUCK: FEDERALISM AND CANADIAN ENVIROMENTAL POLICY 50
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treaty rights have been explicitly recognized in the Canadian Constitution. In the
Quebec case, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal regulator had to consider the
impact of the project on the aboriginal residents and the failure to do so could amount
to an infringement of their constitutional rights. While it has been acknowledged that
the current dispute in the Flathead Basin could potentially affect First Nations groups
in Canada, these groups have yet to reach treaty agreements with the government of
Canada, nor do they live on federal reserves. Therefore, they may not be entitled to
the same protection that the aboriginal group received in the Quebec case.
Regardless of which government (or governments) ultimately has jurisdiction to
regulate transboundary freshwater disputes, it appears that the federal government
has established a recent trend of abdicating its environmental protection
responsibility to provincial governments. The result has been the proliferation of
regional agreements aimed at resolving and avoiding disputes among sub national
actors. Apart from the ICJ, which is unlikely to enter the picture in this dispute due to
the reluctance of the Canadian and British Columbian governments to agree to such a
mechanism, regional agreements might assist in resolving the dispute.
Differences in the requirements of the British Columbian and federal
environmental impact assessment processes prompted U.S. regulators to request that
the more comprehensive assessment be used in the Flathead area. While opponents
to the Lodgepole mine would prefer no mine development at all, they have also
advocated for a federal assessment under CEAA, and a three- to five-year baseline
assessment before any exploratory drilling is completed. Section 16(1) of the CEAA
provides for a consideration of cumulative effects:
Every screening or comprehensive study of a project.. .shall include a
consideration of the following factors:
(a) the environmental effects of the project, including the environmental
effects of malfunctions or accidents that may occur in connection with
the project and any cumulative environmental effects that are likely to
result from the project in combination with other projects or activities
that have been or will be carried out;
(b) the significance of the effects referred to in paragraph (a);
(c) comments from the public that are received in accordance with this Act
and the regulations;
(d) measures that are technically and economically feasible and that would
mitigate any significant adverse environmental effects of the project;
and
(e) any other matter relevant...

56.
57.

Part H of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. II (U.K.).
Canadian Enviromental Assessment Act, 1992 S.C., ch. 37, § 16(l) (Can.).
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Section 16(2) of CEAA requires additional factors be considered in certain types
of assessments. These factors include:
(a) the purpose of the project;
(b) alternative means of carrying out the project that are technically and
economically feasible and the environmental effects of any such
alternative means;
(c) the need for, and the requirements of, any follow-up program in
respect of the project; and
(d) the capacity of renewable resources that are likely to be significantly
affected by the project to meet the needs of the present and those of
5
the future.
Elaine Hughes et al. note that the evaluation of the significance of the
environmental effects under CEAA is based on the following "three part test":
(1) Are the environmental effects adverse? (2) Are the adverse
environmental effects significant? and (3) Are the significant adverse
environmental effects likely? According to the Responsible Authority
Guide, significance must be determined objectively, having regard for
scientific and technical information.5 9
In addition, Elaine Hughes et al. cite CurraghResources Inc. v. The Queen in
Right of Canada (1992), 87 DLR (4th) 219 (FCTD) for the proposition that
"mitigation or compensation measures must in fact prevent potentially adverse
environmental effects from becoming significant" as opposed to requiring
measures that "merely could prevent environmental effects from becoming
significant." 6
As demonstrated in the preceding section, the question of jurisdiction over
the regulation of the proposed coal and CBM projects is clearly a complicated
one. While the Canadian federal government has become involved in the
environmental assessment process, many critics feel that the less thorough
provincial assessment is inadequate. It is unlikely that opponents of development
in the Flathead Basin will be satisfied until the Canadian federal government
agrees to conduct a cumulative assessment of transboundary impacts on both
aquatic and terrestrial species, and include the involvement of an independent
panel made up of American and Canadian members. At this point, the chances of
this happening appear to be slim.

58. Id. § 16(2).
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C. CurrentRegulation and Development of ProposedProjects in the Flathead
Region
The 2004 Canada-British Columbia Agreement on Environmental
Assessment Cooperation,6' provides for harmonized reviews when EAs are
62
required under both the CEAA and the BCEAA. In accordance with this
agreement, Cline Mining Corporation developed draft Terms of Reference (TOR)
to address requirements under the CEAA and the BCEAA. The draft TOR was
finalized, however, prior to a determination by the federal government as to
whether any project components were to be subject to review under the CEAA.
When the Lodgepole Coal Mine project description was initially submitted on
January 9, 2006, the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office (EAO)
issued a section 10 order under the BCEAA, requiring an Environmental
Assessment Certificate for the project. The EAO also issued a Section 11 order to
stipulate the scope of the project, the scope of the assessment, and the procedures
and methods for assessing the project. Included in the order was a requirement
for the completion of a draft TOR, the contents of which were to identify the
issues to be addressed and the information to be provided by Cline Mining
Corporation in its Application. Cline was to provide sufficient data and analysis
in the application to allow evaluation of the potential effects of the project on
First Nations, government agencies, local governments, stakeholders and the
public. The approved TOR was to incorporate comments from federal,
provincial, and local government agencies, First Nations representatives and the
public based on their review of the proponents draft TOR.
After completion of the draft TOR, the BCEAO invited public consultation
from numerous stakeholders including Montana residents and state agencies.
Among them were the State of Montana, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes, the Flathead Basin Commission, and various federal agencies such as the
U.S. Department of the Interior. The response was overwhelming. Many noted
that the proposed timeline for the beginning of the mine development was too
fast, and that the draft TOR lacked important information. In a letter dated April
14, 2006, the Chief Policy Advisor to Governor Brian Schweitzer wrote to the
Director of Strategic Policy Planning, Garry Alexander, commenting:
Given the breadth of data collection required to attain a comprehensive
baseline and scientific understanding of potential impacts, the proposed
timeline does not ensure that the socio-economic and environmental
impacts of the proposed mine will be adequately addressed. Due to the
lack of information in the TOR, including the lack of an adequate

61. Agreement on Enviromental Assessment Cooperation, Can.-B.C. (2004), available at http://www.
eao.gov.bc.ca/pub/can-bc-agreement/can-bc-agree-mar 1104.pdf.
62. Enviromental Assessment Act, S.B.C., ch. 43 (2002).
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summary of the proposed project, the reviewing agencies found it
difficult to provide detailed and constructive comments.63
These concerns were echoed in the State of Montana Comments on the Draft
Terms of Reference-Cline Mining Corporation Lodgepole Project.64 Montana
noted that the IJC 1988 Flathead River International Study: Board
Supplementary Report stated the inadequacy of the available data needed to make
predictions and determine mitigating measures. 6 According to the report, the
most pressing deficiencies were in regard to "ground water, sediment, nitrate and
ammonia, nutrients, and various components of the biota including fish." 66 The
concerns expressed in the 1988 Report were similar to those expressed by the
State of Montana in its comments on the proposed coal mine prompting the
current dispute. Again, the State of Montana pointed out a lack of data in regard
to the project itself, groundwater, fish habitat, risk assessment, wildlife
management, alternatives, and socio-economic impacts. 6' The Montana
government also pointed out that a request for Canadian federal review under the
CEAA to address cumulative impacts and transboundary impacts would be
necessary. 6' According to the State of Montana, "the proposed mine triggers
Section 47 of the CEAA, which, '[a]llows a foreign state or subdivision thereof
(ie; the state of Montana) to initiate this reference through a request to the
Canadian Minister of the Environment based on concerns that developments in
one country will negatively impact another."' 69
In response to numerous issues raised about the Lodgepole Mine draft TOR,
the British Columbian government sent the mine proponent back to the drawing
board to develop a revised draft. However, the revised draft TOR did little to
alleviate the concerns of Montana stakeholders about the project. According to
Rich Moy, Chairman of the Flathead Basin Commission in Montana, the British
Columbian government "essentially 'ignored' recommendations that a Montana
delegation submitted on the draft terms of reference. 70 Noting his
disappointment in the outcome of the opportunity for public comment, Moy
stated: "[w]e're appreciative that British Columbia allowed us to participate in
the regulatory process regarding the Cline mine. We would have hoped that
63. Letter from Hal Harper, Chief Policy Adviser to Governor Brian Schweitzer, to Garry Alexander,
Director, Strategic Policy and Planning Envtl. Assessment Office (April 14, 2006), http://flathead
basincommission.org/mining/cline/reference/l_2007PublicTOR.pdf.
64. STATE OF MONTANA, COMMENTS DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE-CLINE MINING CORP.
LODGEPOLE PROJECT (2006), available at http://flatheadbasincommission.org/mining/cline/reference/

MT.draft4.12.06.pdf.
65. Id. at 1.
66. Id.
67. See generally id.
68. Id. at 4.
69. Id.
70. Jim Mann, BC Launching Review of Cline Mine, DAILY INTER LAKE, Dec. 22, 2006, available at:
http://www.dailyinterlake.com/articles/2006/12/22/news/newsO3.txt.
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British Columbia would have incorporated our comments, but they did not...
Basically, for the most part, they ignored our issues. 7'
The U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) also expressed concern about the
revised draft that Cline released in December 2006. Like the State of Montana,
the DOI was concerned that the TOR focussed "too narrowly on individual
components of the proposed mining operation and does not adequately provide
for the assessment of cumulative project impacts, especially transboundary
impacts. 72 The DOI recommended that baseline data be collected on terrestrial
species, and a "3-5 year baseline survey on fish and wildlife resources. 73 Again,
concerns about the inadequacy of the information provided in the draft TOR were
evident.
Since the release of the revised draft TOR, Montana's congressional
delegation and Governor Schweitzer continue to "request[] the most rigorous
type of federal review under Canadian law. 74 On December 13, 2007, the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency published a "notice of
commencement" for review of the Lodgepole mine. However, instead of being
triggered by Section 47 as suggested in Montana's Comments, the review was
triggered by Section 5.7'The federal review will be carried out by Fisheries and
Oceans Canada,76 and is considerably less intensive than that being sought by
opponents of the mine. Whereas review of Section 47 would require study by an
independent panel that many observers hoped would include US scientists, the
review under Section 5 will be carried out only by a Canadian federal agency.
Will Hammerquist, Glacier Program Manager for the National Parks
Conservation Association, stated that the current level of review falls short of
what should be required. He remarked that "[a]n adequate level of review for a
project like this should be the most rigorous type of review under Canadian
law."77 Hammerquist also noted that he was disappointed the notice made no
mention of utilizing the research that has been completed by Montana and U.S.
scientists in the transboundary Flathead drainage. 78 According to Hammerquist,
U.S. scientists have amassed a wealth of scientific research in the Flathead Basin,
while efforts on the Canadian side have been lacking. 79 Rich Moy, Chairperson of
the Flathead Basin Commission, said that he was "pleased that the Canadian

71. Id.
72. Letter from Willie R. Taylor, supra note 6, at 2.
73. Id. at 13.
74. Jim Mann, Canada OKs Limited Review of Mine Plans, DAILY INTER LAKE, Dec. 18, 2007,
available at: http://www.dailyinterlake.com/articles/2007/12/18/news/news02.txt.
75. See Press Release, Canadian Envtl. Assessment Agency, Notice of Commencement of an Envtl.
Assessment (Dec.13, 2007), available at http:/lwww.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/050/details-eng.cfmevaluation=36201
&ForceNOC=Y.
76. See id.
77. Mann, supranote 70.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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government is getting involved," but expressed that he was still somewhat
concerned that the involvement was only coming from the Department of
Fisheries. ° According to a newspaper report in the Missoulian, the review that
Moy and Governor Schweitzer are seeking is far more extensive than that
proposed:
[They] want a full cumulative effects study, which would include
terrestrial species as well as aquatic. They want a transboundary analysis,
and aninternational review panel to assess the collective science. In short,
they want a comprehensive analysis of environmental conditions in the
wilderness valley, on both sides of the international line.8'
The dispute remains a sore spot in cross-border relations between Montana
and British Columbia, and has gained national attention in the United States. In
June 2008, President Barack Obama's campaign official, Matt Chandler, wrote
an e-mail to Hammerquist, stating that Obama, "supports efforts by Senators
Max Baucus and Jon Tester as well as Gov[ernor] Brian Schweitzer to stop the
' Despite this, the BCEAO recently stated that the project was at the
Cline mine."82
pre-approval stage. The potential for further strain on US-Canada relations has
left many seeking processes to resolve the dispute. Traditional methods of
transboundary dispute resolution such as the International Joint Commission
appear to be making way for regional and sub-national agreements. Political
lobbying and the influence of state agencies such as the Flathead Basin
Commission and community business alliances such as the Flathead Coalition
have played an extremely important role in the dispute.
III. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES POSED BY COAL AND CBM
DEVELOPMENT IN THE FLATHEAD BASIN - PROTECTING WATER QUALITY AND
FISHERIES' RESOURCES IN BOTH CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

In their 2006 analysis of the water quality and fishery resources in the
Canadian section of the Flathead Basin, Sax and Keiter noted that the North Fork
of the Flathead River is:
"[t]he last uninhabited major watershed in Canada" with unsurpassed
water and air quality... The ESA-listed bull trout is doing better in the

80. Michael Jamison, CanadianFeds Agree to Review ProposedFlatheadMine, MISSOULIAN, Mar. 31,
2007, available at http://www.missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/artice-e47f9805-5d63-554a-ael2-66
fd95b83f55.html.
81. Id.
82. Andy Ivans, Obama Onside to Stop B.C. Open-pit Coal Mine near Montana, THE VANCOUVER
PROVINCE, June 4, 2008, available at http://www.canada.comltheprovince/newslstory.htmlid=O 1803a I 1-ce2943be-b99b-2e4d6abedd30.
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Flathead watershed than anywhere else in the region, and biologists
believe the basin's tributary streams serve as crucial spawning grounds."
In light of the pristine nature of the watershed, there are significant concerns
about the impact of the proposed coal mining development, CBM development,
and the combined effects of both. We will first consider coal mining as the type
of mineral extraction project at a more advanced stage of consideration.
A.

Sustainable Development Challenges Posed by Coal Mining in the Flathead
Basin

In its 1988 Report on the proposed Cabin Creek Mine, the International Joint
Commission concluded there was a great deal of uncertainty regarding the
potential environmental impacts from the coal mine. 84 Among other things, this
uncertainty related to the mine design and the possible contamination of
groundwater with its subsequent interaction with other water bodies.85 The
Commission was particularly concerned about the possible effects on the bull
trout spawning grounds, given the proposed location of the mine in the Flathead
Basin.86 Additionally, the Commission concluded that the combined effects of the
mine including the "liberation of toxic substances" would have a significant
negative impact on fish habitat.8 7 Because the Cline Mine would also be located
in the Flathead Basin, the concerns are similar to those identified in 1988 by the
IJC in the Cabin Creek Mine Referral.
B.

SustainableDevelopment Challenges Posed by CBM Development in the
FlatheadBasin

There is uncertainty about the impacts from CBM development on the fish
resources in British Columbia and downstream in the United States. There are
twenty-four species of fish in the Flathead River including the Bull Trout (which
is listed under the U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA))"5 and the Kokanee
Salmon.89 A 2008 report on another species of salmon, Coalbed Methane and
Salmon: Assessing the Risks,90 considered the risk from CBM extraction in

83. Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, Realities of Regional Resource Management: Glacier National
Parkand its Neighbours Revisited, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 286 (2006).
84. ICJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 7-8.
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003).
89. See FLATHEAD RIVER INT'L STUDY, BOARD REPORT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS (1988)
(discussing the impact on various fish living in the river, including the bull trout).
90.

GW SOLUTIONS INC., THE PEMBINA INST., COALBED METHANE & SALMON: ASSESSING THE RISK v,

43-44 (Randee Holmes ed., 2008), available at http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/cbmandsalmon-rpt.pdf.
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another area in British Columbia. The report concluded that CBM extraction
"poses potentially significant risks" to another species of salmon. 9 According to
Jaisel Vadgama, a senior policy analyst on the report stated, "scientists don't yet
know how harmful the impacts on salmon would be." 92 The 2008 report
concluded that land clearing for CBM development "can change the patterns and
intensity of runoff, increasing erosion. This can lead to muddier streams and
destruction of spawning habitat. Groundwater removal, even when it occurs deep
underground, can change the flow and temperature of streams. 93
Concerns in Montana about CBM development along the Flathead River
arise from the problems it has encountered from the discharge of produced water
from CBM operations in Wyoming. In the Powder River Basin (PRB), which
encompasses part of Wyoming and Montana, up to "sixty million gallons of
water each day are being dumped on the surface in northern Wyoming., 94 The
Montana government has expressed concerns to Wyoming regulators about
produced water flowing from CBM wells into creeks and rivers in Wyoming,
because it can degrade the quality of the water used by Montana ranchers and
farmers downstream.
The salinity of the produced water can cause significant degradation in the
quality of water in rivers and other water bodies. 9' Experience with CBM
development in the western United States has revealed that discharging produced
saline water directly into creeks and surface water bodies can cause damage to
crops and other plant life while simultaneously affecting the organisms that feed
on the plant life. 96 Deborah Elcock et al. have noted that:
CBM-produced water can contain concentrations of sodium, total
dissolved solids (TDS), total suspended solids (TSS), fluoride, chloride,
ammonia, and metals higher than those of the receiving waters. The
sodium absorption ratio (SAR) is the ratio of the sodium ion
concentration to the combined concentrations of calcium and magnesium
ion in water. Water with high SARs can cause soils to become dispersed,
less permeable (resulting in reduced plant growth), and more prone to
erosion; such waters may not be appropriate for irrigation. High levels of
soil salinity, resulting from irrigation with some produced water can
reduce crop yields. The cumulative effects of produced water on crop

91. Media Release, Pembina Institute, Report: Coalbed Methane Extraction in Northwest British
Columbia Would Put Salmon at Risk, (May 15, 2008), availableat http://bc.pembina.org/media-release/1636.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. James Murphy, Slowing the Onslaught and Forecasting Hope for Change: Litigation Efforts
Concerning the Environmental Impacts of Coalbed Methane Development in the Powder River Basin, 24 PACE
ENVTL.L. REV. 399, 407 (2007).
95. Id. at 406.
96. Id. at 409.
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soils and yield and the factors that influence those effects are not
completely understood.97
CBM development in the western United States has revealed that there is
uncertainty about the extent of some of the negative environmental impacts from
the discharge of produced water on fish. Elcock et al. note that "[h]ydrologic
changes resulting from CBM operations may adversely affect fisheries; the
nature and extent of those effects, however, are largely unknown. 98 One
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for proposed CBM development in the
Powder River Basin concluded that "water levels in wells completed in
developed coals within 10 miles of CBM development are likely to drop and that
flow rates in artesian wells and springs sourced within the area are likely to
decrease." 99
In light of the uncertainty about water impacts in the Western United States,
it should be noted that even less is known about the impacts from CBM
production in British Columbia, as most of the Canadian production to date has
been from "dry" Alberta coals which contain no water or negligible amounts of
water. There is no track record of CBM operations in British Columbia, as the
first commercial production in the province was in 2009 and that production is
not in the Flathead River area.
C. Sustainable Development Challenges Posed by both Coal and CBM
Development in the FlatheadBasin
As noted above, there are significant concerns about the discharge of
produced water from CBM wells in British Columbia on the quality of water in
the Flathead River and the potential impacts on the spawning grounds for bull
trout. '°° It is even less clear what the impacts might be on water and the
associated resources from both a coal mine and CBM operations along the
Flathead. If the effluent from the coal mine and/or CBM operations degrades the
water quality downstream there could be irreversible environmental damage. The
following impacts from coal and CBM development in Canada are described by
Sax and Keiter:
The environmental impacts associated with this massive industrial incursion
into the Canadian Flathead would be significant by any measure. Mining projects
of this magnitude will require an expansive infrastructure of new roads and
pipelines that will have to be constructed on unstable mountain terrain. Water
quality degradation is also a major concern. The proposed Cline coal mine could
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dramatically increase sedimentation levels and toxic pollutants in North Fork
tributary streams and destroy bull trout spawning grounds. Coalbed methane
development, based on experience elsewhere, involves extracting massive
amounts of alkaline wastewater that must be disposed of somewhere. Wildlife
would also be put at risk. New roads and drilling rigs will mean habitat loss and
fragmentation, increased poaching opportunities, and the severance of key
migratory routes... These impacts are not confined to the Canadian side.
Sedimentation and toxic pollutants will disperse throughout the entire Flathead
drainage, threatening the river's aquatic ecology and its fisheries. Wildlife
displacement, habitat losses, and migration blockages will create stresses across
the regional ecosystem. Of particular concern is the 'threatened' grizzly
bear ....
101
There has never been a project in Canada for which an EIA has considered
the impacts from both a coal mine and CBM production on water and the
associated fisheries resources. Furthermore, a study on the cumulative effects
from coal mine and CBM development on the transboundary fisheries resources
in the Flathead River has yet to be completed. Given this high level of
uncertainty, this clearly appears to be a situation in which the precautionary
principle should be applied.
The precautionary principle provides that when there is a threat of serious
environmental damage, scientific uncertainty should not be utilized as the basis
to postpone measures which are cost effective to prevent the degradation of water
quality and the associated fisheries. Arguably it is more cost effective to carefully
study and consider the environmental impacts before the mineral development
proceeds and water contamination occurs, resulting in substantial remediation
costs. To that end, it is suggested that before any coal or CBM development in
the Canadian Flathead proceeds, a transboundary environmental impact
assessment (TEIA) that incorporates scientific evidence collected by U.S.
scientists is more cost effective than ignoring the studies. The TEIA, in addition,
could more effectively deal with the uncertainty posed by the proposed
combination of coal and CBM development in the Canadian Flathead Basin.
IV. THE CBM REGULATORY REGIME ADOPTED BY THE BC GOVERNMENT
FOR PRODUCED WATER

Notwithstanding the absence of actual commercial CBM production in the
province until 2009, the British Columbian government has considered the CBM
development experience in the Western United States and has adopted a
comprehensive regime to protect water resources from CBM extraction. In order
to evaluate the degree of environmental protection for water afforded by the
British Columbian CBM legal framework, we will first consider the current
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regime in Montana and then compare it with the British Columbian regulatory
system.
A.

Environmental Protectionfrom Produced Water in Montana

In Montana, CBM operators are subject to state laws, federal laws or both,
depending on whether the CBM is owned and/or located under land owned by
the state government, federal government or by a private individual. 0 2 Where
CBM is developed on federal lands, the Bureau of Land Management assumes
the role of primary regulatory agency.' 3 When a well is on state or private land, it
is regulated by the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), the Department
of Natural Resource Conservation (DNRC) and the Montana Board of Oil and
Gas Conservation (MBOGC). °4 By and large, the state laws are industry-friendly
and pro-development. As of 2005, the MBOGC had not denied approval for any
CBM well on grounds relating to environmental impacts.' 5 With regard to the
environmental effects of produced water, the most important state agency is the
DEQ because it administers the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System6
(NPDES) and associated permits authorized by the Clean Water Act.'
Moreover, the DEQ
has the responsibility to regulate any pollutants released into
0 7
state.'
the
of
waters
The State of Montana began issuing permits for CBM operations in the late
1990s, even though the DEQ, MBOGC and DNRC had not completed an
assessment of the specific environmental impacts of CBM development. 5 The
Northern Plains Resource Council challenged the MBOGC's actions in court,
and the parties settled with the relevant agencies agreeing to implement a
moratorium baring approval of CBM well permit applications. "o9 The
Moratorium was to remain in effect "until an environmental impact statement
(EIS) specifically addressing CBM development was completed."' 0 In 2003, the
DEQ, MBOGC and Bureau of Land Management issued records of decision for
the jointly conducted EIS."'
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In its Record of Decision, the DEQ notes that pursuant to Montana's Water
Quality Act, it "regulates the discharge of pollutants into state waters through the
adoption of water quality standards and the permit process," and that the Record
of Decision would determine the manner in which "water quality permitting for
coal bed methane development will occur."" 2 The Record of Decision states:
Water quality standards specify what changes in water quality are
allowed as a result of discharges to state waters and establish a basis for
wastewater discharge permitting. DEQ's water quality standards program
has two levels of protection: (1) protection of the designated uses of
waters, and (2) prevention of significant degradation of high quality
waters. In order to achieve the first purpose, state waters are classified
according to the uses they are capable of supporting. Standards designed
to protect those specific uses are then applied to those waters. For the
non-degradation process, significance levels are established for new or
increased discharges. If a proposed discharge would exceed the
significance level, the discharger must apply for an authorization to
degrade .... ."
Against this backdrop, in 2003 the Montana Board of Environmental Review
enacted numeric electrical conductivity (EC) and sodium absorption ratio (SAR)
standards for CBM produced water released into streams in the Powder River
Basin including: the Powder River, Little Powder River, Tongue River, Rosebud
Creek and tributaries." 4 The Record of decision goes on to state:
For discharge of coal bed methane water to state waters in other basins
not covered by the rule, the narrative standard, contained in ARM
17.30.637 is applicable. That rule prohibits discharges which will create
concentrations that are toxic or harmful to human, animal, plant or
aquatic life."5
The Record of Decision also confirms that releasing CBM produced water
into any state waters will require an MPDES permit from the DEQ." 6 It further
states that, "DEQ must require compliance with state water quality standards,

of Land Mgmt. et al, Record of Decision for the Final Statewide Oil and Gas Envtl. Impact Statement and
Proposed Amendment of Powder River and Billings Res. Mgmt. Plans (Jan. 2003), available at
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l.pdf (Supplemented in 2008. 2008 supplement, available at http://www.blm.gov/eis/mt/milescity
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including nondegradation requirements."' 7 The non-degradation standards play
an important role in produced water regulation. As the Appellee's brief in
Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Montana Board of Environmental Review explains, that
when the Montana Board of Environmental Review (BER) established numeric
standards in 2003 it:
[A]ddressed EC and SAR for purposes of Montana's nondegradation
policy, which is designed to protect high quality water. BER voted to
retain a narrative nonsignificance criterion for high quality water (rather
than imposing numeric thresholds) to determine whether a
nondegradation review is triggered ... As a result of its 2003 decision to
retain a narrative nonsignificance standard, BER acknowledged that EC
and SAR became the only parameters to which numeric standards
applied, but for which there were no corresponding numeric nonsignificance criteria."'
In 2005, the BER again began a rule-making process to address requests that
it determine, for purposes of Montana's non-degradation policy, that EC and
SAR are "harmful" elements.' 9 In addition, the BER was also petitioned to
mandate that CBM produced water be re-injected or that it undergo treatment.
Again, the Appellee's brief explains,
[d]esignation of EC and SAR as harmful parameters meant that
discharges containing those constituents qualify as 'nonsignificant' for
purposes of nondegradation review 'only if the changes outside of a
mixing zone designated by the [DEQ] are less than 10% of the applicable
standard and the existing water quality level is less than 40% of the
standard' . . . The significance is that if a discharge does not qualify as
nonsignificant, the discharger must obtain an authorization to degrade
prior to discharging. 121
In 2006, the BER declared EC and SAR "harmful" for purposes of the state's
nondegradation policy, as the proposal had requested. 22 However, the BER
"rejected" the
proposition that injection of CBM produced water should be
3
mandatory.
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In short, Montana authorities have established a system of numeric standards
and numeric nondegradation rules to deal with produced water from CBM
development in the Powder River Basin and other rivers discussed above. The
previous narrative standards remain in effect for those river basins not described
in the Record of Decision.
B. Produced Water Regulation in British Columbia
The British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission (BCOGC) and the Ministry
of Water, Land and Air Protection (MWLAP) are the most significant regulatory
agencies for CBM production in British Columbia.' 4 As the name implies, the
Code of Practice for the Discharge of Produced Water from Coalbed Gas
Operations25' contains the regulations with regard to the discharge of produced
water in British Columbia. The Code became effective on July 1, 2005, and
authorized surface discharge into streams and on the ground in certain
circumstances. 26 In 2007, the British Columbian government released The BC
Energy Plan: A Vision for Clean Energy Leadership. Under this plan, British
Columbia would have "the best coalbed gas practices in North America.
Companies will not be allowed to surface discharge produced water. Any reinjected produced water must be injected well below any domestic water
aquifer.' ' 27 In addition, under the Energy Plan, companies must "fully engag[e]
communities and First Nations.' 28
In response to the requirements of the energy plan, the Minister of
Environment and Minister Responsible for Water Stewardship and Sustainable
Communities issued an order amending the Code to prohibit surface discharge
except in cases where "section 4.1 of the Waste Discharge Regulation applies."'2 9
Section 4.1 of the Waste Discharge Regulation provides an exemption for CBM
producers from the general requirement under the Section 6(2) and (3) of the
Environmental Management Act that they do not allow waste to pollute the
environment while carrying on business operations.'" However, Section 4.1 of
the Waste Discharge Regulation only grandfathers certain CBM operations that

124. See Alan Ingelson, Jason Gray & Pauline Li McLean, CBM Produced Water-The Emerging
Canadian Regulatory Framework, 10 U. DENVER WATER L. REV. 23, 35-36 (2006).
125. Code of Practice for the Discharge of Produced Water from Coalbed Gas Operations
(Environmental Management Act) B.C. Reg. 156/2005 (Can.), available at http://www.bclaws.ca.
126. Id.
127. Press Release, B.C. Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Res., BC Energy Plan Outlines
Vision for Clean Energy (Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://www.energyplan.gov.bc.ca/PDF/2007EM
PR0008_000178.pdf.
128. The BC Energy Plan, Oil and Gas Policies 4 http://www.energyplan.gov.bc.ca/PDF/BC
EnergyPlanOil-andGas.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
129. Ministerial Order No. M 294 (Mar. 11, 2008) (Can.).
130. Waste Discharge Regulation (Environmental Management Act) B.C. Reg. 320-2004, § 4.1(Can.);
Environmental Management Act, 2003 S.B.C., ch. 53, §§ 6(2), (3) (Can.).
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were registered and producing water before the effective date of the section. '3
The Ministry of Environment claims that as a result of the changes to the Code,
"[p]roduced water must be disposed of to an underground formation in
accordance with the Oil and Gas Waste Regulation." 3 2 Section 7(1) of the Oil
and Gas Waste Regulation allows produced water to be injected underground in
compliance with applicable regulations and statutes.'33 With regard to this
process, the B.C. Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources website
states:
In approving an application to re-inject produced water into the ground
the OGC considers information such as the location and design of the reinjection well, the geological properties of the proposed underground
area, and the composition of the water being injected. Companies must
isolate the subsurface disposal areas from potential groundwater zones
and prove that these formations will contain the anticipated volumes of
re-injected water. To protect drinking water from possible crosscontamination, all disposal wells are lined with steel casing that is
cemented into the well bore. The OGC also requires that there be
monitoring conducted throughout the re-injection process."'
In addition, the Ministry's website claims the BCOGC will mandate
"companies to carry out water well testing within a one kilometre radius of
[CBM] wells."'

5

In summary, consistent with the commitments set out in the BC

Energy Plan, the British Columbia government has created a regulatory scheme
that effectively bars surface discharge of produced water, regardless of the water
quality.
C. Sustainabilityand the Montana and British Columbia Produced Water
Regimes
The regulatory systems for produced water in Montana and British Columbia
will be considered in the context of sustainable water practices, in light of the
uncertainty surrounding the environmental impacts on water from CBM
operations. Barrett argues that the most sustainable water disposal methods are:
1. [r]einjection into aquifers depleted or otherwise affected by CBM
production;
131. Waste Discharge Regulation (Environmental Management Act) B.C. Reg. 320-2004, § 4. 1(Can.).
132. Ministry of Env't, Industrial Waste, http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/epd/industriallregs/codes/coalbed/
index.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
133. Oil and Gas Waste Regulation (Environmental Management Act) B.C. Reg. 254/2005, § 7(1)
(Can.).
134. B.C. Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Res., Questions and Answers: Coalbed Gas,
http://www.em.gov.bc.calSubwebs/CoalbedGas/FAQs/Q&ACBG.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
135. Id.
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2.

[i]njection or percolation into depleted aquifers with water treatment
as required, protecting, and/or enhancing water quality;

3. [c]rop, livestock, municipal, or industrial use with water treatment
and other mitigations as required, ensuring against negative impacts;
4.

[s]urface discharges with water treatment as required, resulting in
improved stream flows with adequate mitigations against negative
impacts.

The least sustainable practices are:
1. [e]vaporation of water resulting in loss of [the] resource;
2. [i]njection or percolation into aquifers where water quality [has]
deteriorated and negative hydrological impacts occur;
3. [1]and application that creates negative impacts on soils and water
quality;
4.

impact
[d]irect discharges that degrade water quality and negatively
36
aquatic life, downstream user, or result in loss of resource.

From the list above, it is clear that when subsurface injection of produced
water is completed according to best oil industry practices, this method of water
disposal is more sustainable because it avoids the negative surface discharge
impacts observed in Wyoming and may assist in replenishing the aquifer.
Discharging produced water into a river without treatment is a less sustainable
practice. This is a view adopted by environmental groups in Montana such as The
Montana Environmental Information Center (MEIC), a self-described
"government agency watchdog."' 37 The MEIC argues that re-injection of
produced water is the most favourable method to dispose of produced water,
stating: "[u]ltimately, re-injection has to be the answer for CBM water." '38 Duffy
also states that the "Northern Plains Resource Council has supported legislation
requiring CBM drillers to treat discharge water and re-inject it into the ground,
arguing that re-injection is 'the most sustainable, reasonable, and appropriate
method for dealing with water produced by coal bed methane wells."' "3 9

136. Colby Barrett, Fitting a Square Peg in a Round (Drill) Hole: The Evolving Legal Treatment of
Coalbed Methane-Produced Water in the Intermountain West, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10661,
10668 (2008).
137. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., About MEIC, http://www.meic.org/about (last visited June 20, 2009).
138. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., Coal Bed Methane, http://www.meic.orglwater-quality/coal-bed-methane
(last visited June 20, 2009).
139. Duffy, supra note 102, at 428.
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The uncertainty surrounding the effects of CBM operations was specifically
dealt with by Jack Stanford and Richard Hauer in a White Paper prepared at the
behest of Montana legislators.' 4° The authors ranked methods for dealing with4
'
produced water, from the most environmentally uncertain and risky to the least.'
The authors rank "discharge to surface water" as the method most uncertain
option and one that poses the largest risk to the environment. 4 2 On the opposite
end of the spectrum "injection" is ranked as the least uncertain and posing the
smallest risk.'4 3 The authors suggest that "[t]he water problem could most simply
be solved by re-injection."' 4 However, this method of disposal is more costly
than other measures.145
Based on the foregoing analysis of the Montana and British Columbia
regulatory systems, as the framework in British Columbia requires subsurface
injection, it appears to provide more protection for water resources than those in
Montana. In light of British Columbia's more stringent regulatory requirements,
the potential for water degradation from CBM operations in British Columbia
appears to be less than in Montana. It should be remembered that the Montana
BER declined to set standards that require produced water to be treated or
injected.
However, it should also be noted that a simple comparison between how
British Columbia and Montana would regulate CBM in the Flathead Basin is
problematic. The Flathead River is not among the rivers where the BER numeric
standards are applicable, and therefore, the narrative standards apply to produced
water discharged in that area. The narrative standard requires that the CBM
producer show the permitting agency that the discharge is not "toxic" or
"harmful" to aquatic and other forms of life. It is unclear how this standard
would be applied in the Flathead Basin. In light of the proximity to Glacier
National Park, federal and state regulators still have reservations about CBM
development that might proceed along the Flathead River in British Columbia, as
it has in the Powder River Basin. The state government may not have developed
numeric water quality standards for the Flathead River because it does not
anticipate granting any CBM drilling permits in the Montana portion of the
Flathead Basin.
The requirement that water produced from CBM wells in British Columbia
must be injected should provide some comfort to Montana residents and
regulators. However, as noted above, there remains significant uncertainty about

140. Jack A. Stanford & F. Richard Hauer, Coalbed Methane (CBM) in Montana: Problems and
Solutions, A White Paper 1, 3 (Feb. 4, 2003), http://www.umt.edu/flbs/research/cbmfinal2-5-03.pdf.
141. Id. at 10-11. The methods are ranked with regard to the effect they may have on Montana
ecosystems.
142. Id. at 11.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 13.
145. See id. at 8.
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the cumulative impacts from combined coal and CBM development on water and
fishery resources and a lack of CBM operational experience in southeast British
Columbia, in a different sedimentary basin than the Powder River. Water and
fisheries' environmental degradation from CBM development has already
occurred in Wyoming and Montana. Coals in a variety of sedimentary basins
have different chemical and physical characteristics that may result in different
environmental impacts. The combined coal and CBM production near the
Flathead appears to be the first project in North America (and possibly the world)
in which coal and CBM development may occur near an international border and
upstream from a national park in a pristine ecosystem. No one really knows what
the cumulative effects from coal mining and CBM extraction will be.
V. UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE CUMULATIVE IMPACTS FROM COAL AND CBM
DEVELOPMENT ALONG THE FLATHEAD AND THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION FINDINGS

In light of the uncertainty about the impacts from most recent coal mine
proposal, the State of Montana requested that the issue to be taken again to the
International Joint Commission (IJC), an independent bilateral organization
arising out of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, (BWT) 46 (this was also the case
with the Cabin Creek coal mine in the 1980s). The BWT establishes legal rules
and processes to help resolve disputes "primarily concerning water quality and
water quantity along the boundary between Canada and the United States." 47 The
treaty defines "boundary waters" as the waters of lakes and rivers connecting
waterways or portions thereof, along which the international boundary between
the United States and the Dominion of Canada passes bays and inlets, not
including rivers flowing across the boundary' 4 8 The Flathead River is not
"boundary water" for the purposes of this article. However, Article IV of the
BWT applies to both boundary waters and "waters flowing across the
boundary,"' 49 such as the Flathead River. Therefore, Article IV applies in the
current dispute. Article IV states that boundary and transboundary waters, "shall
not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property of the other."' 5
Opponents of development in the Flathead Basin can argue that the use of the
words "shall not" creates a legal obligation to avoid transboundary pollution and
that the nature of the proposed development in the Flathead Basin automatically
146. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between
United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art.vii, viii, Jan. 11,1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
147. Int'l Joint Comm'n, Who We Are, http://www.ijc.org/rel/agree/water.html (last visited Dec.
2009).
148. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between
United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Preliminary art., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
149. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between
United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art.vi, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
150. Id.
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calls for the intervention of the IJC.' 5 ' However, as noted by Dino Ross, finding a
binding legal obligation in the words of Article IV is difficult for a variety of
reasons, including the lack of a definition for either of the key terms, "pollution"
or "injury."' 52 Ross also notes that the incorporation of the Harmon Doctrine in
Article II has been described as affecting the treaty in this way:
That doctrine was formulated in 1895 by Attorney General Judson Harmon
to deal with apportionment of waters flowing out of the United States into
Mexico. It states that nations have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the
uses of all waters within their boundaries. The strongly nationalistic terms of the
doctrine are only slightly tempered by subsequent language in Article II stating
that a downstream user injured by an upstream user is entitled to the same rights
and remedies he would have if the injury had occurred in the source nation.
Realistically, this "right" to legal recourse in the source nation is almost
completely hampered by the difficulty of filing suit and enforcing damages in a
'
foreign country. 53
Therefore, neither country has attempted to utilize Article IV in a binding
fashion. Nonetheless, the IJC has played a valuable role in resolving some
transboundary water disputes between the United States and Canada, such as the
Cabin Creek Mine.
A.

The Cabin Creek Coal Mine Referral

"Provincial approval [of the Cabin Creek proposed in the 1980s] was made
conditional on actions taken by the Canadian government pursuant to Boundary
Waters Treaty obligations.' 54 In December 1984, the U.S. government formally
submitted the matter to the IJC for non-binding recommendations by way of
letter with the Canadian government following suit in February 1985. The IJC
was requested to "examine and report on the water quality and quantity of the
Flathead River in connection with the coal mine that was previously
conditionally approved by the British Columbia Government, and to make
recommendations which would assist Governments in assuring that provisions of
Article IV of the said treaty are honoured."' 55 In response to this task, the IJC
established the Flathead River International Study Board, which undertook a
three- year investigation into the effects of the proposed Cabin Creek Coal Mine.
Based on its findings regarding water pollution, effects on fish, and the ambiguity
of the Coal Creek Mine Proposal, the Board recommended the following:

151.
152.
153.
REv., 110,
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155.

See Dino, supra note 2, at 227.
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Id. at 227-28 (quoting Wilson, Cabin Creek and International Law-An Overview, 5 PUB. LAND L.
119 (1984)).
id. at 227 (quoting Wilson, supra note 153, at 117).
ICJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 1, 15.
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2) the mine proposal not received regulatory approval in the future
unless and until it can be demonstrated that:
(a) the potential transboundary impacts identified in the report of the
Flathead River International Study Board, have been determined
with reasonable certainty and would constitute a level of risk
acceptable to both governments; and,
(b) the potential impacts on the sport fishing populations and habitat
in the Flathead River system would not occur could be fully
mitigated in an effective and assured manner; and,
3) the governments consider, with the appropriate jurisdictions,
opportunities for defining and implementing compatible, equitable and
sustainable development activities and management strategies in the
upper Flathead River basin. 116
In light of these recommendations, Sage Creek let its provincial permit lapse,
and the British Columbian government stated that it was satisfied with the IJC's
findings, although Canada has not accepted the same. 5 7 Also arising out of the
1988 IJC Report was the suggestion that international watershed management
boards be created in areas where such disputes have arisen.
B. The Prospectof an InternationalWatershed Management Board Now in the
FlatheadRiver Basin
In the 1988 IJC Report, the Board recommended the following:
It may be desirable in such cases, including this case, to consider some
bilateral process for identifying and assisting in creative, alternative
development opportunities that are both sustainable and consistent with
maintaining the aforementioned environmental requirements pertinent to
Article IV, while paying due regard to the legitimate goals of the other
country.158
The IJC has previously used the powers given to it under the BWT to create a
number of watershed management boards. 5 9 One of the touted advantages of the

156. Id. at 11.
157. Michael Azulay, The Flathead River Basin: How Could a Functioning LIC International Watershed
Board be Created and What Would the Board's Purpose, Powers, Membership and Jurisdiction Be? 9
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
158. IJC Report, supra note 5, at 9.
159. Int'l Joint Comm'n, Boards, http://www.ijc.org/en/boards/boards_conseils.htm (last visited Dec.
20, 2009) (citing the following: International Columbia River Board of Control, International Kootenay Lake
Board of Control, International Lake of the Woods Control Board, International Lake Superior Board of
Control, International Niagara Board of Control, International Osoyoos Lake Board of Control, International
Rainy Lake Board of Control, International Rainy River Water Pollution Board, International Red River Board
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creation of an international watershed management board is that it ensures that
interested parties "collect, coordinate and have access to baseline data."'160 In
February 2000, the Flathead Basin Commission requested cooperation from the
IJC in developing an international watershed management board in the Flathead
Basin, "in part because the FBC [had] not been able to establish an effective
working relationship with the province of B.C.' 61 United States IJC Chair,
Dennis Schornack, responded in December 2005, advising the FBC that the IJC
would "facilitate the creation of a permanent B.C.-Montana Flathead watershed
board as a dispute-avoidance mechanism."'162 The trouble is that the creation of
such a board "requires the cooperation and consent of all levels of government on
both sides of the border."' 63 The British Columbian Government is now wary
about submitting to a quasi-judicial board that would limit its course of future
action. 64 Michael Azulay, a member of United Nations University-International

Network on Water, Environment and Health, suggests that in order to bring
British Columbia on board, the mandate of the watershed board should be limited
to "information gathering and dissemination."'' 6 British Columbia, however, has
been very clear that it has no interest in establishing an IJC watershed board
anywhere in the province. 66 Inlight of the current dispute, it appears increasingly
unlikely that British Columbia would be willing to submit to such a mechanism,
especially as it would likely represent further delays in proposed development.
VI. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR INCREASED COHERENCY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT ASSESSMENT PROCESS BETWEEN CANADA AND U.S.

An important opportunity for increased coherency in the EIA process is
provided by the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context (or Espoo Convention). 67 Furthering the sustainable
development policies of the Canadian, British Columbian and United States
governments, the Preamble to the Convention outlines the objectives of the
convention:
Affirming the need to ensure environmentally sound and sustainable
development,

International Souris River Board, International St. Croix River Board, International St. Lawrence River Board
of Control and the Great Lakes Water Quality Board).
160. Azulay, supra note 157, at 15.
161. Id. at 16.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 17.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 18.
166. Id. at 17.
167. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 800.
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Determined to enhance international co-operation
environmental impact in a transboundary context,

in

assessing

Mindful of the need and importance to develop anticipatory policies of
preventing, mitigating and monitoring significant adverse environmental
68
impact in general and more specifically in a transboundary context.
The convention reflects sustainable development and requires member
parties to conduct a transboundary environmental impact assessment (TEIA)
when developments are "likely to cause a significant adverse transboundary
69
impact," and are delineated in the relevant appendix to the Convention.1
Appendix I to the Convention lists major coal mining operations and large
"[g]roundwater abstraction" as "activities" that require a TEIA if they are "likely
to cause a significant adverse transboundary impact." 7 ° Therefore, we submit that
the combined proposed Lodgepole Coal Mine and CBM development in the
Flathead Basin should require a TEIA under the Espoo Convention.
The TEIA must be conducted according to the provisions in the
Convention, 7 ' which require a "Party of origin" to give "an opportunity to the
public in areas likely to be affected to participate in relevant environmental
impact assessment procedures regarding proposed activities and [to] ensure that
the opportunity provided to the public of the affected Party is equivalent to that
provided to the public of Party of origin."'' In addition, the Convention requires
TEIAs to be "undertaken at the project level."'73 The Convention outlines the type
of information that must be disclosed to an "affected Party" and requires the
"Party of origin," after the TEIA is completed, to "enter into consultations with
the affected Party concerning, inter alia, the potential transboundary 4 impact of
the proposed activity and measures to reduce or eliminate its impact.""
Unlike Canada, the U.S. Government has not ratified the Convention, even
though it was a signatory in 1991." ' Had the U.S. Government ratified the
Convention, we submit that the public in Montana would have had more input
into the approval process to date and the U.S. Government and/or Montana State
Government would have had the opportunity to enter into direct consultation
with the British Columbian government regarding the proposed mining and
energy development projects.

168. Id. Preamble.
169. Id. art. 2(3).
170. Id. art 2(3), app. I (12), (14).
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172. Id. art. 2(6).
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The Espoo Convention affords an opportunity for the current U.S.
administration and Congress to promote sustainable development by ratifying the
Convention. Given the high profile nature of the Flathead dispute and the fact
that many of Montana's concerns would have been dealt with had the U.S.
ratified the convention, this situation might provide a justification for the Obama
administration to promote sustainable development by ratifying the Convention.
The Convention, which defines an EIA as a "national procedure,"' 76 requires
that a TEIA contain at least:
(a) A description of the proposed activity and its purpose;
(b) A description, where appropriate, of reasonable alternatives (for
example, locational or technological) to the proposed activity and
also the no-action alternative;
(c) A description of the environment likely to be significantly affected
by the proposed activity and its alternatives;
(d) A description of the potential environmental impacts of the proposed
activity and its alternatives and an estimation of its significance;
(e) A description of mitigation measures to keep adverse environmental
impact to a minimum;
(f) An explicit indication of predictive methods and underlying
assumptions as well as the relevant environmental data used;
(g) An identification of gaps in knowledge and
encountered in compiling the required information;

uncertainties

(h) Where appropriate, an outline for monitoring and management
programmes and any plans for post-project analysis; and
(i) A non-technical summary including
a visual presentation as
77
appropriate (maps, graphs, etc.).1
A. Method for Carrying out TEIA
In light of the Canadian government's international legal duty to protect the
quality of the water in the Flathead River, the uncertain environmental impacts
associated with the proposed coal and CBM development in the Canadian section
of the Flathead basin, we submit that Canada would be well advised to agree to a
TEIA. However, conducting such an assessment in the Flathead Basin will likely
require the use of procedures not contained in CEAA. Craik explains that even

176. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context art. l(vi)(7), Feb.
25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 800.
177. Id. App. I1.
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though the U.S. and Canadian EIA laws provide for the assessment of
transboundary effects, these laws assess the transboundary effects simply "as an
extension of the domestic EIA process so as to include the consideration of
impacts beyond the boundaries of the state... the assumption is that domestic and
TEIA processes need not be differentiated."'' However, Craik argues the
assumption is faulty because transboundary environmental effects can "trigger[]
international legal obligations," and because a "TEIA raises unique issues
concerning access to information, notice and consultation and the availability of
remedies to affected persons.' ' 79 Given these considerations, it appears that an
EIA conducted under Canadian law alone would be insufficient. Therefore, we
propose adopting the requirements of the Espoo Convention.
As stated above, the Espoo Convention defines a TEIA as a "national
procedure," and therefore, Section 16 of Canadian Environmental Assessment
Act (CEAA) could certainly provide the basis for a TEIA in the Flathead Region.
To that end, additional measures would be required to address the concerns stated
above. For example, the Convention would require a TEIA to include
mechanisms that would provide, inter alia, concerned residents and other
stakeholders in Montana with the same level of input as the public in British
Columbia, an arrangement for producing information to the U.S. (as required
under the Convention), and for the establishment of a process allowing
government agencies to enter into consultations after the assessment is
completed. In these consultations, the U.S. government and State of Montana
could address their many concerns, such as the use of scientific information it has
developed pertaining to the Flathead Basin.
It should be noted that this process does not require the reviewing body be
composed of officials from the U.S. as well as Canada, as some of the opponents
have sought. In this regard, the TEIA as proposed above is somewhat of a middle
ground between the two positions.
B. Why Should the British Columbia Government Support a TEIA in the
Flathead?
The British Columbian government should support the use of a TEIA in the
Flathead dispute to avoid the controversy from environmental regulatory takings
and the payment of significant compensation to the mine developer, as was the
case in the Windy Craggy Mine dispute. The British Columbian government was
embroiled in a serious international environmental controversy after it issued the
mineral rights to Geddes Resources Ltd. and the company developed a world
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class copper deposit near the Alaskan border. 80 "Windy Craggy Mountain is
located in a spectacular wilderness area surrounded by Canadian and U.S.
parks-Kluane National Park, the Wrangell-St. Elias and Glacier Bay National
Parks, and the Tongass National Forest in Alaska."' 8 ' The British Columbian
government faced pressure regarding the proposed mine from environmental
groups and U.S. Vice President, Al Gore. 1 2 The proposal to build the mine was
ultimately rejected, 8 3 and in 1993 the British Columbian government designated
the area as a park which "effectively [killed] the proposed Windy Craggy coppergold mine."''M In 1995, the British Columbian government agreed to a "$166
million cash and a benefits package" as "compensation for its 1992 expropriation
of the Windy Craggy copper project."'85
The similarities between the Windy Creek and Flathead scenarios are
striking. The most obvious similarity is the proximity of both proposed mineral
development areas to the U.S. border and national parks. Furthermore, both
disputes attracted the attention and involved influential U.S. politicians. Thus,
conducting a thorough TEIA could stifle the criticism and pressure that is certain
to follow should the proposed projects be approved without a comprehensive
EIA. Moreover, it seems clear that it is desirable to accurately assess the
environmental impacts and require effective mitigation measures before approval
rather than later in the process when the government will be more vulnerable to
environmental takings claims.
Additionally, the British Columbian government should note the outcome in
another environmental regulatory taking dispute, in which the U.S. Government
provided $65 million in compensation to the mine developer when it refused to
86
approve the New World Mine near the boundary of Yellowstone National Park.
In response to environmental concerns about mine development close to the
National Park Boundary, the U.S. Government refused to approve the project,
notwithstanding the fact that it had awarded the mineral rights to the developer
and compensation provided to the mine proponent.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Flathead Basin international water dispute raises complex constitutional
issues in Canada that elicit no easy solution. The decision of the British
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Columbian government to allow a coal mine upstream from an ecologically
sensitive and pristine area near Glacier National Park has roused controversy and
adamant opposition from both sides of the international border. Most opponents
to the proposed coal mine argue that the provincial environmental assessment
process required for the project is inadequate, even with an announcement that
the Canadian Federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans will also conduct a
review under the CEAA. There is general consensus among critics that the draft
TOR submitted by the mine developer in the provincial process contains
inadequate information, and omits vital scientific research conducted in the U.S.
in regard to cumulative and transboundary impacts. Major players in the dispute
have advocated that a three- to five-year baseline assessment be completed
before any mineral development proceeds, while the mine developer has
expressed its intent to be in operation in the Flathead within the next couple
years.
Challenges to sustainable development are created by even more uncertain
cumulative environmental effects from combined coal and CBM operations. This
uncertainty and the significant risks to the environment in both Canada and the
U.S. underscore the importance of completing a more thorough TEIA that
examines the cumulative effects in both countries from mineral extraction,
alternatives to mineral development in the Flathead area and mitigation practices.
Notwithstanding an existing environmental cooperation agreement between
the Canadian federal government and the British Columbian provincial
government, the question of jurisdiction over transboundary freshwater continues
to be a perplexing issue for the promotion of sustainable development. While the
Canadian Constitution is unclear in regard to federal or provincial jurisdiction
over transboundary freshwater, arguably the federal government can exercise
jurisdiction in the Flathead dispute owing to the international character of the
dispute and potential transboundary impacts from the proposed coal and CBM
development. Previous decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have
highlighted the broad context of the application of the residual POGG power
provided in the Canadian Constitution. Nonetheless, as has been discussed in this
paper, the decentralization of Canada-U.S. environmental cooperation is apparent
in the proliferation of regional agreements such as the British Columbia and
Montana environmental cooperation agreement. While the use of regional
environmental cooperation agreements have been successful in some cases to
avoid or resolve transboundary disputes, the Montana and British Columbia
environmental cooperation agreement has been of little value in resolving the
concerns in this energy-water dispute. Consideration of the dispute by an
international watershed management board in the Flathead Region has been
rejected by the British Columbia government. This dispute has prompted local,
regional, national, and international interest. Local politicians, state agencies, and
non-governmental groups, as well as concerned citizens have become the major
players in this dispute. Organized pressure from both sides of the border has
played a role in the decision of the British Columbian government to retreat from
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allowing BP to proceed with CBM development in the Flathead Basin for now.
Continued lobbying efforts by U.S. politicians may lead to similar results with
the proposed Lodgepole mine.
With the decentralization of environmental cooperation between the U.S. and
Canada, such stakeholder groups may become increasingly important in
resolving transboundary environmental disputes in the future. The unpredictable
and haphazard EIA process evident in this dispute could be improved through the
implementation of a TEIA in the Flathead region. Interested stakeholders in the
U.S. would be in favour of such a process.
The support of the British Columbian government to complete a TEIA
should be based on avoiding the payment of significant takings compensation as
in the Windy Craggy dispute. In addition the completion of a TEIA is consistent
with the British Columbian government's policy of "sustainable" mineral
development. Currently, the Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources
website contains the following statement on mining, the environment and
sustainable development:
B.C.'s mining and mineral exploration industry upholds world-class
standards. Strict standards for clean air and water... apply throughout
each of the phases of mining. Both the Province and industry recognize
that minimizing an operation's impacts on the surrounding environment
is essential to ensuring
the mining and mineral exploration sector's long7
sustainability.1
term
Given such a commitment to upholding the strictest environmental standards
in the world, it should follow that the British Columbian government would have
little to fear from a TEIA that includes input from U.S. scientists, especially after
considering that the produced water regulations in Montana do not appear to be
as strict as those adopted by in British Columbia. As noted above, conducting a
TEIA would be consistent with Canada's obligation to avoid transboundary
pollution under emerging international law. In light of the potential liability
arising from transboundary water contamination in the current Trail Smelter
dispute, and the duty of a state to avoid cross-border contamination, the Canadian
federal government would be well advised to facilitate a TEIA for the Flathead
Basin, as it will be cost efficient to avoid the water contamination problem before
the environmental damage occurs.

187. B.C. Ministry of Mines and Petroleum Re, Sustainable Development in British Columbia: Mining
and the Environment, http:www.empr.gov.bc.ca/Mining/Sustainability/Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 15,
2009).

